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THE GENERAL NATURE OF THE CONDITIONS 
WHICH DETERMINE DEVELOPMENT. 
THE saying of the witty Autocrat "that the brain often runs away with the heart's best blood" has its applica-
tion to Philosophy, for every great system of thought 
springs from profound feeling—from an intense passion 
for order, a deep longing for unity. In the philosophy of 
<.^, science of the last few decades this was expressed in the 
conception of sociological phenomena as being organic, or 
even (at a somewhat earlier period) as in some important 
aspects physical;1 and more recently in the comparison 
drawn between the electronic atom and planetary groups. 
But the inadequacy of the conception of society as an or-
ganism has long been manifest; so that to-day some uni-
versal term is required that shall be truly all inclusive, 
and capable of expressing the concrete character (should 
there be one) of all reality. 
But any such universal character, if it were also truly 
concrete, would be scientific as much as philosophic — it 
would be philosophical as expressive of all reality, and 
scientific as applicable to every reality. Two modern think-
ers agree, however, though for widely different reasons, 
in rejecting any such identification of science with philos-
ophy;—Bergson, because science is vitiated by the defects 
inherent in the intellect, and therefore cannot apprehend 
1
 Cf. Bagehot's Physics and Politics. Plato had discovered much in common 
between the spirit of the individual and of the community. 
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real duration; and Croce, because science is essentially 
non-philosophical, and employs not the true concept but 
always pseudo-concepts.2 On the other hand Hegel en-
dorses this principle, at least formally; for his first cate-
gory—Pure Being—although too abstract to permit the 
thought of "every reality," is still, while purely abstractly, 
expressive of "all reality"; on the other hand the supreme 
category—Idea or Spirit3—would prove extremely difficult 
to apply directly in any sense consonant with the present 
usages of science. But if we follow Dr. McTaggart in his 
contention that the Hegelian Idea implies that "The Uni-
verse is differentiated. It consists of an organic system of 
individuals," we obtain at once a principle4 fundamental 
to all science both in its most general and in its most 
specialized aspects. The Universe is, in the first place, 
differentiated; as such it is a system (not for science but) 
for philosophy; and further, it is differentiated throughout 
—it is a system of individuals, each of which again is itself 
a subsystem, great or small as the case may be, and each, 
from this point of view, constituting the subject matter of 
some department of science.6 
If then the term "system" is given its widest and most 
profound meaning, it becomes equally applicable to all 
reality and to every reality, and thus the concrete universal 
of philosophy finds its proper place also in the realm of 
science. It is certainly unfortunate that the usual meaning 
of "system" is narrow and specialized; we think of "busi-
ness" or "memory systems" etc.; still even in these the 
really essential feature is present in the sense of the com-
pletcst possible organization — the absence of all super-
:
 Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept, p. 46. 
3
 Cf. McTaggart, Commentary, sec. 294. 
4
 Loc. cit. sec. 292; mathematical procedure is analogous in the transforma-
tion or degeneration of equations. 
5
 Or other department of knowledge which cannot however, in view of the 
unity of all knowledge, be severed from science. 
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fluity and irrelevance. Instead then of regarding society 
e. g., as an organism, it is philosophically truer to look upon 
both alike as systems which, while differing in their special 
details, are similar in their possession of coherence, rele-
vance and interconnection. 
The universe again (still following here Dr. McTag-
garf's reading of Hegel) is an organic system; just as no 
organism is static, so is every natural system essentially 
dynamic—changing, evolving.enduring. Certainly we may, 
but only by limitation and abstraction, distinguish states 
of static equilibrim of shorter or longer duration; but this 
static aspect is always merely superficial or (in a sense) 
illusory and, always underlain by force or activity, is but 
a temporary though necessary stage in the total develop-
ment; all states of equilibrium arise out of dynamic con-
ditions which at the moment counteract each other. If then 
we assign to "system" the dynamic character which is dis-
tinctive of all living organisms, we are enabled (I think) 
to trace connections which unite or (to coin a word) 
"monify" categories of existence apparently widely sepa-
rated, even if the actual detailed evidence for this is very 
slight. Tn this way "vitalism" and "mechanism" become 
complementary to each other instead of being antagonistic;" 
and I have previously endeavoured to prove that the devel-
opment of the universe is necessarily a continous advance 
and never, as a whole, retrogressive.7 
At first sight, certainly, the concrete phenomena and 
conditions of this development are so infinitely diverse that 
knowledge seems compelled to remain always departmen-
tal: each science having its own distinct principles, appli-
cable within its special sphere, but yielding at best only 
analogies, perhaps faint and distant, to other realms of 
8
 I may refer to Science Progress, No. 50. p. 305. 
7
 The Monist, April 1920, p. 203. Perhaps "development within the Uni-
verse" would be a better expression. How a Universe can truly develop is of 
course an extremely difficult problem. 
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truth; thus the laws of motioa are as foreign to psychology 
as are the principles of association to chemistry. Within 
limits, and mainly in the abstract sciences, this "irrelevance 
of determining principles," as it may be called, is slowly 
vanishing; thus mass and energy would appear to be 
identical, and all forces are probably electro-magnetic.8 
How far then is it possible to carry this principle of the 
monistic transcendence of externality? To what extent 
is it possible to determine perfectly general conditions of 
development?—to express i.e. conditions which govern 
every type of change whether simple or complex, physical, 
vital, or social. Can we ascertain the universal character-
istics of (a) all embryonic or early stages, (b) all mature 
and stable stages, whatever be the detailed course develop-
ment may follow ? 
There has first to be considered the concept of "origin." 
Today it is almost a platitude to say that everything has, 
and indeed must have, an origin; but the obviousness of this 
assertion should not obscure two important points—(a) 
that the problems of origin are always amongst the most 
difficult to solve and (b) that earlier stages of knowledge, 
either explicitly or implicitly, assumed that these problems 
were actually insoluble, and fell back upon statements of 
which the opening words of Genesis may be taken as the 
type.0 Even today it remains true that no assigned origin 
is ever absolute, and that some degree of relativity, of arbi-
trariness, or even of conventionality, determines which 
stage or set of conditions is regarded as original. Subject 
to these considerations I should like to consider how far the 
8
 The irrelevance is at its minimum when knowledge is most abstract i. e. 
in pure mathematics, which may be regarded as an extensive and increasing 
application of a few simple principles, applicable also, directly or analogically, 
within formal or symbolic logic. 
9
 This does not imply, however, that such utterances have wholly lost their 
value; at the same time this necessarily changes relevantly to the growth of 
knowledge as a whole. 
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universal or perfectly general attributes of "origin" can be 
ascertained. 
Every origin, in the first place, however simple it may 
be, must possess some degree of systematic structure, which 
again must be, either patently or covertly, of such a nature 
that some measure of continuity (or in more philosophic 
language, identity),10 exists between it and all later stages. 
Here again we are often driven back upon more or less 
arbitrary principles in order to establish such continuity. 
How far e.g. is it true to say, in view of the immigrant 
flood, that the national characteristics of the United States 
are identical with those of the thirteen colonies? and the 
same problem appears in a different form if we ask how the 
ingestion of food and the resultant tissue renewal bear on 
the identity of the organism. 
But wherever there arises this difficulty of determining, 
from among any series of connected stages, the actual 
origin, it plainly indicates the absence of any absolutely 
distinctive criterion; it implies (in other words) that all the 
stages, whatever their degree of difference may become, are 
still alike in the possession of some common quality. This 
universally common quality is (once again) systematic 
structure; development, that is, in all cases and at every 
stage consists in the combination" of different constituent 
systems among which, as systems, it is frequently very diffi-
cult or indeed impossible to determine the essential origin 
and continuity; and it is only when one of the many system-
atic structures becomes in itself obviously dominant that it 
is selected as the real origin, or basis of true continuity. 
But this dominance or obviousness is always plainly a mat-
ter of degree and of relativity; the immigrants e.g. during 
10 Not however the bare identity A = A of formal logic. It is obvious that 
till this abstract self-identity is somehow transcended no knowledge is at all 
possible. 
11
 In exceptional cases, dissociation, which is merged however in some later 
combination. 
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any selected brief period are much more loosely connected 
than are the United States of that same period; on the other 
hand, if the German invasion of Belgium had succeeded, 
the Belgian nationality would have been so radically altered 
that history would probably have been compelled to recog-
nise a new "origin," as it has often done in times when 
armed conquests were the rule rather than the exception. 
For a philosophy or knowledge ideally complete then 
every such contributory system would be equally essential, 
because such a final philosophy would possess the Absolute 
as its criterion of universal relativity;12 our actual knowl-
edge, however, must in its incompleteness adopt now one 
criterion and now another ; thus, to cite one example, in the 
evolution of humanity "origin" and "continuity" assume 
wholly different aspects according to whether we view 
personal development as an end in itself, or as contributory 
to the existence of nationality or humanity as a whole. 
But further, in thus insisting on the necessity of the 
conception of systematic structure, it is obvious that we 
have passed beyond the consideration of mere change as 
such. The idea of change merely in itself is superficial and 
abstract, and of little value beyond very limited ranges of 
phenomena.™ Change must be regarded as occurring 
always within a systematic universe, and as itself therefore 
sharing in and contributing to its systematic nature; thus 
viewed it becomes the abstract aspect of some concrete 
development, and denotes in reality the progressive combina-
tion of diverse systems into an increasingly complex whole. 
12
 It seems too often forgotten that "relativity" is itself relative; therefore 
not being itself absolute, it necessarily implies an absolue; as e. g. Time in 
Newtonian mechanics, and "proper time" in relativity mechanics. 
13
 But the concept of change has always held a prominent place in phil-
osophy from the ir&vra Jet of Heracleitus to our own day. Cf. e.g. 
"What I find when I look at consciousness is a sequence of different feelings." 
(Shadworth Hodgson, Philosophy of Reflection, vol. I. p .248.) "Such a 
description", comments James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 230), "can 
awaken no possible protest." 
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I think it is important to notice that this is not a con-
clusion which, at the present level of knowledge, can be 
obtained on mere a priori grounds; even if there are (as T 
believe) sound general philosophic reasons in its favour, 
still a "kaleidoscopic" universe—one i.e. in which perfectly 
haphazard changes constantly occurred which, though 
governed by law, still served no final end—does not seem 
prima facie to be wholly inconceivable; and in what sense 
such a world could be regarded as truly systematic is a diffi-
cult question. 
Actual experience, however, presents to us development 
from origins; thus far we have seen that in all cases where 
it is difficult to discover the true origin, this difficulty 
resolves itself into that of the lack of criteria which enable 
us to select from among the many cooperating systems any 
one that is indubitably basal and dominant. But this con-
clusion has an obverse aspect which T should now like to 
consider—the problem i.e. of those attributes on which our 
choice of origin is actually based in cases where it proves to 
be quite well founded. 
One such attribute that is very often insisted upon is the 
simplicity of origins; but this merely in itself is plainly an 
insufficient, and may even become a wholly misleading, cri-
terion; and this for two reasons—(a) because simplicity is 
itself always relative, and (b) because every stage in 
development is in some aspects simpler than succeeding 
stages. Tt is true that we can often trace this increasing 
simplicity back to a point where a single further step would 
bring us to an earlier system which itself appears highly 
complex, and we then feel justified in placing the line of 
distinction between such a "parent" system and the "simple" 
system which springs from it.1' But however legitimate 
14
 The living germ is the most obvious instance; but this should, for con-
scious beings, include mental phenomena, which vastly increases the difficulties. 
But almost all social origins are on the same footing as regards their simplicity. 
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this procedure may be, it raises two obvious difficulties— 
(a) as to the nature of the "simplicity" of the origin and 
(b) as to its relation to its own previous origin or parent 
system. 
In the first place, it seems exceedingly doubtful whether 
the "simplicity" thus attributed to origins has any actual 
existence; here we may often be completely deceived by ap-
pearance. Certainly all investigation shows that the living 
germ is exceedingly complex—as complex indeed in one way 
as is the adult organism in another; and this again is con-
firmed by the degree in which the germ itself largely deter-
mines the total course of development, which then comes to 
resemble the breaking down or the unfolding of a pre-
existing highly complex but much condensed structure; an 
interpretation which is still more obvious in the case of the 
radioactive elements. Here then it is not so much a ques-
tion of different degrees of complexity as of different modes, 
and of the gradual conversion of one mode into 'the other. 
Expressed again in still more general terms, all germinal 
stages appear to have a higher degree of potentiality than 
the later, so that in this respect the usual contrast as to 
simplicity is actually reversed. If we compare e.g. the 
spiritual endowments of the "simple" early Roman republic 
with those of the 'complex" but decadent Empire, there can 
be no doubt as to which possessed the greatest potential 
capacity; in all such cases the child is, in a very real sense, 
the father of the man. And whatever were the defects of 
the earlier "preformation" or emboitement theories of vital 
development they at least recognized and expressed (if only 
by implication) the high complexity of all the various 
stages. 
Thus the essential character of origins is not so much 
the degree, as the mode, of their complexity. Their sys-
tematic structure is such that each of the constituents, while 
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all remaining united together, is capable of entering into a 
series of combinations continuously, until a new system has 
been constructed whose elements are so combined inter se 
that few new combinations remain possible. It is obvious 
that in both cases alike the degree of complexity must be 
very high; the only difference then must be between the 
two modes; for only a highly complex system will be 
capable of providing the innumerable bases and connections 
whereby the resultant system can arise; only an exceedingly 
complex structure can be ihus active and potential, and the 
simplicity so often ascribed to origins is very largely 
illusory and abstract. 
Development then—i.e. the change from original sys-
tems to adult—is best interpreted not as an increase in, but 
as a continuous transformation of, the mode of the com-
plexity of the developing system; and it is obvious that if 
this transformation were to become complete, development 
would thereupon cease. In individual cases it does thus 
come to an end; and the transcendence of this finality is 
rendered possible only by the conservation, in some way or 
other, of that special mode of complex structure character-
istic of original systems. The most concrete instance is 
that of the reproductive elements in living organisms; but 
analogous phenomena occur wherever we find expansion 
and development—in the spiritual faculties of creative 
genius—in the adventurous and enterprising members of a 
nation, be that primitive and obscure or mighty and famous. 
Thus the maintenance of universal development depends 
on the union, in all the component individual systems, of 
two radically different modes of complex structure—the 
one stable, more or less rigid, narrowly specialized in some 
limited direction, and therefore incapable of functioning in 
any other way; and from this arise the elements of regu-
larity and mechanicality;—the other able to enter into a 
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long series of widely diverse combinations between which 
it functions as the common basis of union, and so con-
tributes to the universe the contrasted characters of 
infinite plasticity and originality,—I'elan vital. 
Reality, then, regarded as a developing whole, every-
where presents these two widely differing aspects; but it is 
fundamentally important to note that each is indispensable 
to the other, without whose activity it could not itself exist. 
This universality of mechanism in the world has always 
been a serious stumbling block to every philosophy that has 
considered itself idealistic; its apparent want of that free-
dom supposed to be inherent in mind or spirit has made it 
difficult to explain, while its patency makes it equally impos-
sible to explain it away. On the other hand it has been as 
fully misinterpreted in the opposite direction by those crude 
materialisms which have taken it to prove that all spiritual 
values are only epiphenomenal; even Lotze, who, despite 
his wide scientific knowledge was no materialist, seeks its 
justification in that direct appeal to "divine wisdom,"15 
which is always a confession of philosophic bankruptcy. 
Bergson indeed does in a sense attempt to explain it away 
by regarding the mechanical as but the distortion, due to 
the intellect, of the true character of reality; and the basal 
defect of his system consists in this exaggerated insistence 
on the "durational" aspect of the world and the consequent 
unjustified depreciation of all mechanism. It is necessary, 
of course, to draw between them a profound distinction; 
and it is probably inevitable that every philosophic system 
must somewhere place too marked an emphasis; but Berg-
son's dichotomy is altogether too absolute. For he regards 
two elements which are in truth complementary and so 
equally real, the one as merely illusory, while only its fellow 
15
 "Conceiving it not as a self supporting fate but merely as a product of 
divine wisdom;" Microcosmus, Vol. I, p. 399. 
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is truly real; and two correlatively different methods of 
apprehension again—the one intellective, the other intu-
itional—then subserve our full consciousness of real being. 
But such an attitude wholly misinterprets the status of 
those fixed and completed elements in the world which are 
the fruits of its eternal process; between these and the 
processes which brought them into being there need be no 
antagonism whatever, provided they themselves conserve 
and maintain, as they obviously do, the means necessary 
for further development; each then—process and product, 
the mechanical and the dynamic—is the indispensable basis 
and complement of the other; nor does any impassable 
barrier prevent the mind from apprehending the real nature 
of either; for thought, even when farthest removed from 
full reality, is a self-condemned exile, and finds, as genius 
ever does, new life and strength in the deserts of abstrac-
tion, whence it returns armed with weapons still more 
powerful for its conquest of the concrete. 
There still remains to be considered the question: In 
what consists the specific potentiality and complexity of all 
origins as such ? What enables them to initiate and control 
new courses of development?—new i.e. even as individual 
instances of some generic type, much more when there is 
no pre-existent class to which they must conform. 
The essential characteristic appears to be the advanced 
level of organisation which all origins possess, relatively 
(a) to their parent systems and (b) to the environment in 
which they can best function. In some respects or other 
this plane of organisation is always higher than that of 
both the environment and the parent source; and therefore 
every element in such an original system16 is capable of 
entering into combination with other systems which are 
18
 Except those necessary to maintain the system's existence as an origin; 
e.g. the cell wall of orRanic germs. 
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(ex hypothesi) lower in the level of organisation than 
itself; for none of these constituents can find its proper com-
plement, or can satisfy its powerful affinities, within the 
limits of the origin itself. The resultant systems again are 
(also ex hypothesi) incapable of repeating that precise 
form of combination from which they arose, so that the 
original capacity for combination becomes automatically 
more and more limited at every stage in the process; in 
other words the potentiality of combination necessarily falls 
as the stability or fixity of the resultant system rises. 
Potentiality becomes gradually converted into actuality— 
the dynamic into the static"—the "durational" into the 
mechanical—without however either of these two funda-
mental aspects acquiring a degree of reality superior to that 
of the other, as is contended (in one direction) by the 
philosophies of materialism or of mechanical determinism, 
and (in the other) by the intuitional philosophy of Bergson. 
If we venture to carry the enquiry still a stage further, 
and to seek the ground of this higher level of organisation 
to which all origins attain, we can only fall back (I think) 
on some such general philosophic principle as I have 
endeavoured to establish in a previous number of The 
Monist;1* but a few additional remarks may be helpful 
regarding the difference which exists between the possibili-
ties of organic, and of sociological or historic development. 
Regarding the phenomena from the widest possible 
standpoint, the plasticity of organic development may be 
called specific rather than individual; the limits of the group 
i.e. appears to be more elastic than those of the individual, 
whose development is in the main confined to a fixed course 
from which little deviation is possible. This seems to be 
true whatever importance mutation theories may prove to 
17
 But see the previous remarks on the relation between these. 
18
 Cf. note 7 ante. 
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possess; for unless a group mutates, the variation is almost 
inevitably swamped so that reversion to type is assured. 
This appears to depend on two causes—(a) the fixed 
character of the organic germ, which again is a necessary 
result of its material nature; and (b) the comparative con-
stancy of the environment of the organic world, which also 
arises from its material constitution. To what degree the 
germ plasm is alterable by external influences is still a 
vexed question, and the inheritance of acquired characters 
an open problem. The invariability of the environment, 
again, both as regards its organic and its inorganic factors, 
is largely relative; nevertheless the operation of these two 
causes taken together would appear to explain the rigidity 
(as it may almost be called) of the course of organic 
development in the individual. 
Social and historic progress, however, is on an entirely 
different plane. Freed from the bonds which confine the 
world of matter, wholly new influences come into play 
whose range and capacity are infinitely wider than those 
which rule the organic;19 and though History may repeat 
itself in principle, it can never do so in details. All spiritual 
development therefore, both national and individual, pro-
ceeds within an environment which is itself rapidly develop-
ing, and every evolving system becomes an active and 
powerful factor in modifying the growth of its fellows. It 
is difficult to say in this respect whether personal or group 
action is the more effective—whether, in other words, the 
"great man theory" of History is well or ill founded. The 
same influence is operative in both cases, but is more con-
centrated in one than in the other. In every community 
destined to achieve greatness there must exist (as we have 
seen already) groups and institutions capable of combining 
with others, it may be externally through colonisation or 
10
 "The Genesis of Freedom," International Journal of Ethics, April, 1920. 
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territorial expansion. On such a community the action of 
a vigorous personality is comparable to that of an enzyme 
or catalyst; it controls the social groups which it finds ready 
to hand and amenable to its influence, having the advan-
tages of more rapid responsiveness to opportunity and less 
inertia than the group. On the other hand the con-
servatism of the group acts like a fly wheel and ensures 
some measure of persistence and continuity. 
A few final remarks on the conditions governing the 
material basis of organic germs may not be out of place. 
During the protracted fall which preceded the solidification 
of the earth the formation of chemical compounds would 
plainly depend on two factors—(a) the quantity of the com-
bining elements and (b) the strength of their affinity; both 
of these, again, depend on the electronic structure of the 
atoms. Their quantity varies with the readiness with which 
the electrons finally unite to form any stable atom, and the 
affinity of the attraction between the various electronic 
systems thus formed. An increased knowledge of atomic 
structure may reveal laws which express some constant 
connection between the chemical activity of atoms and 
their quantitative distribution.20 
The continuous temperature fall again would neces-
sitate the postponement of those combinations, due to the 
weaker affinities, which are possible only at low temper-
atures and in which the attractions are comparatively so 
feeble that the resultant compounds are extremely sensitive 
to external influences. This raises the problem as to how 
the elements concerned in these could be maintained in 
combination, particularly in any complex compound; prob-
ably radiation and enzyme action are among the active 
factors. 
20
 The great range of carbon compounds appears to be connected with the 
exceptionally high frequency of its atomic vibrations. Gases, again, lead to 
maximum molecular disorder. 
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One further important principle seems to be obvious— 
that in all such complex and sensitive systems the various 
elements can be present only in extremely small quantities. 
because only so could they all be brought effectively within 
the range of mutual action. Thus there is an order of 
quantity, acting as a limit applicable to all the elements, 
which cannot be transcended without destroying this 
sensitive complexity; plainly again, should any one element 
increase in quantity, each of the others must increase 
pro rata to maintain that particular combination as such. 
This would be one factor regulating the volume of the 
organic cell. 
These principles may be further extended to complex 
structures other than purely chemical—to all complex 
systems which are in consequence highly sensitive to 
external stimuli; in all these the quantity of each constit-
uent must be relatively small, otherwise (as e.g. in the 
brain) the total quantity requisite for complexity would 
become too unwieldy. Similarly the non-spatial character 
of ideal and spiritual attributes enables them to co-exist in 
their immense variety, so as again to ensure extremely 
sensitive complexity; and if any man frets because of his 
personal obscurity and transience, it may console him to 
realise that these are necessary conditions of all existence 
within a highly organised universe. 
J. E. TURNER. 
LIVERPOOL, ENG. 
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